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The Padilla Wrecking Ball: Advocating for
Change in Post-Padilla Jurisprudence to
Address What Really Ails the Immigration
System’s Treatment of Noncitizen Defendants
in the Post-Conviction Context
Daniel McDermott

a1

I. INTRODUCTION
Waxing poetic about the irony of the bad in life that tends to
accompany the good, a philosopher once opined, “every rose has its
thorn.”1 Just as a rose looks beautiful only until one feels the prick
of its thorns, oftentimes Supreme Court cases that look ‘beautiful’
at first glance turn out to be ‘thornier’ than they appear. On
March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky2. While Padilla appeared to be a ‘beautiful’ decision for noncitizen criminal defendants, it has proven to
be a ‘thorny’ case for those who hope to rely on the decision as a
means to obtaining post-conviction relief.
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky public interest advocates across
the country celebrated the momentous decision, hailing it as one
of the twenty-first century’s greatest rulings. The Court’s decision
in Padilla finally “recognized what professional norms have
required for at least the last two decades,” which is that attorneys
negotiating pleas for their clients must advise their clients regarding deportation consequences.3 Hindsight has shown, however,
that in the post-conviction context Padilla is a much more limited
decision than anyone seemed to appreciate at the time; it is a decision that has drawn both accolades and ire in the years since its
announcement. The driving force behind the uncertainty that sura1
J.D. Candidate, December 2013, University of Miami School of Law. I would
like to thank Professor Rebecca Sharpless for the guidance and direction she
provided. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their constant support,
and for the time spent discussing this article.
1. BRETT MICHAELS, Every Rose Has Its Thorn, on OPEN UP AND SAY. . . AHH!
(Capitol Records 1988).
2. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
3. Rebecca Sharpless & Andrew Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply In
Initial Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings Of Padilla, Chaidez, and
Martinez, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV 301 (2013) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367).
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rounds Padilla on the post-conviction landscape is the fact that,
while most agree that Padilla addressed a necessary issue, state
and lower federal courts have been unable to crystalize exactly
what proposition Padilla stands for. To understand the complicated post-conviction quagmire that is the Padilla decision, this
paper will first provide a brief overview of the three legal
undercurrents4 that converged to give birth to what some originally hailed as the completion of the Gideon v. Wainwright line of
right to counsel cases: (1) the change in the immigration system’s
treatment of noncitizens convicted of relatively minor offenses; (2)
the exponential growth of plea bargains in place of jury trial; and
(3) the evolution of the “ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine.”5
After providing the jurisprudential context in which Padilla
should be read and a brief overview of the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions,6 this paper will illustrate Padilla’s inadequacies in the post-conviction context through a case study of how
the decision was implemented by Florida courts.7 To help explain
these results—ones seemingly contrary to the plain language of
the Padilla decision—this paper will next look at the Padilla case
on remand, and explore why the facts of the case itself make it
such an anomaly.8 By examining the Kentucky Court of Appeals’
reasoning for vacating Mr. Padilla’s sentence, this paper will show
just how little the United States Supreme Court’s decision actually did to assist noncitizen litigants seeking post-conviction relief
based on ineffective assistance of counsel (hereinafter “IAC”)
claims under the Strickland/Hill line of IAC cases. While noncitizen defendants can now base IAC claims on their attorneys’ failure to advise them of the deportation consequences of accepting a
plea, they will still have to show that “a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”9
Given that “longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes,”10 meeting this rationality standard will oftentimes be difficult, if not impossible. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has even recognized that the nature of our criminal justice system results in “individuals who accept a plea bar4. See infra Section II. A-D.
5. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. See infra Section III.
7. See infra Section IV.A.1.
8. See infra Section IV.A.2.
9. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S 470, 480, 486 (2000)).
10. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
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gain[s] receiving shorter sentences than other individuals who are
less morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial.”11 In a system that seeks to make the rejection of plea bargain irrational—
regardless of culpability—many noncitizen defendants will never
be able to benefit from Padilla as they will be unable to satisfy the
second prong of the Strickland/Hill test.
Finally, this paper will analyze alternative and supplemental
approaches to the one taken by the Court in Padilla, as well as
possible remedies to reinforce Padilla’s effectiveness in the postconviction context.12 Justice Scalia’s approach will be analyzed
first, considering both the practicality and effectiveness of implementation, as well as the problems that would exist if the Court
were to take a hands-off approach with the hope that Congress
will act.13 Should the Court desire a more proactive approach than
the one advocated for by Justice Scalia,14 this paper concludes by
proposing the framework for a set of “Padilla Warnings”; these
proposed warnings would, in addition to relying on Sixth Amendment IAC doctrine, be based also on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process jurisprudence in order to protect both
noncitizen defendants’ Due Process rights and the finality of plea
agreements.15 Miranda v. Arizona will serve as a template for the
use of prophylactic measures to address an issue that cuts across
multiple doctrines, in order to disrupt current laws as minimally
as possible. While the Miranda decision has elicited much criticism for the perceived ineffectiveness of its “stock warnings,” the
decision will be relied upon only to illustrate the Court’s willingness to craft an overly broad, “prophylactic” rule for multi-doctrinal issues like the one before the Court in Padilla.16 It is the hope
of this author to highlight the fact that Padilla does not cut
broadly enough to serve as a viable tool for noncitizen defendants
to obtain post-conviction relief and to promote action to remedy
what ails Padilla and its progeny in the post-conviction context.
11. Id.
12. See infra Section IV.B.
13. See infra Section IV.B.2.
14. This author in no way, shape, or form agrees with Justice Scalia’s ultimate
conclusion in Padilla. Scalia’s analysis of the using Sixth Amendment Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel doctrine to reach the Court’s conclusion, however, recognized
the underlying causes of the problems that noncitizens have faced when trying to use
Padilla to obtain post-conviction relief.
15. See infra Section IV.B.3.
16. Vivian Chang, Where Do We Go From Here: Plea Colloquy Warnings and
Immigration Consequences Post-Padilla, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 189, 216 (2011).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Growth of “Crimmigration”

The legislative changes that have given rise to a need for a
case like Padilla are a rather modern advent. Prior to 1917, the
conception of “immigration law” was generally limited to excluding those persons, which Congress found to be undesirable, from
entering the United States.17 This class included prostitutes,
felons, and those convicted of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.18 The classes of excludable criminals were significantly
smaller than today because of the narrow field of crimes constituting felonies at common law (as opposed to our ever-expanding
class of statutorily created felonies). Though there are some examples of early American deportation cases, up until the twentieth
century, immigration laws acted mostly as barriers to entry in
contrast to the catapults employed today to cast those found to be
“undesirable” back to every far-reaching corner of the globe.19 The
body of law related to immigration was drastically altered in 1917,
however, with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1917 (hereinafter “1917 Act”), which made “classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil.”20
Though the 1917 Act laid the foundation for the modern conception of immigration law, it was not the broad-sweeping, proverbial padlock on America’s front door that we see today; rather, the
intention of legislators was only to protect against those previously admitted aliens who later proved to have a “criminal heart
and a criminal tendency.”21 Courts and the legislature, both at the
time of the passage of the 1917 Act and over the course of the
subsequent half-century, recognized that “forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country . . . is a penalty” and the “stakes
are considerable for the individual” subject to deportation.22 In
accordance with a recognition of the high stakes involved in deportation, the 1917 Act included what the Padilla majority referred
to as “a critically important procedural protection to minimize the
17. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010).
18. Id. (discussing the Act of Mar. 3, 1875 that barred convicts and prostitutes
from entering the country, and the subsequent 1891 expansion of the list of
excludable offenses to include persons “who have been convicted of a felony or other
infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”) (internal citations
omitted)).
19. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 608 (1913).
20. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9 (1948).
22. Id.
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risk of unjust deportation”: the judicial recommendation against
deportation, or JRAD.23 With JRAD, at “the time of sentencing or
within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both state and
federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation
“that such alien shall not be deported.”24 When JRAD was exercised to prevent deportation, it was binding upon the executive, as
it was “consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge
conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction
should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.”25 JRAD, along
with the discretion vested in the Attorney General to grant deportation relief, provided a safety net that prevented anything akin to
“such creature as an automatically deportable offense.”26
Since the passage of the 1917 Act, the automatic deportation
safety nets have been slowly whittled away by Congressional acts;
however, they “all pale in comparison to the 1996 passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA).”27 While the IIRIRA was the fat lady singing to signal
the end to discretionary relief for many noncitizen criminal litigants, the erosion actually began with the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), which limited the reach of JRAD.28 Almost
forty years after the passage of the INA, JRAD met its final and
complete demise when “Congress entirely eliminated it.”29 Finally,
Congress removed much of the Attorney General’s discretion by
passing the IIRIRA, which “eliminated the 212(c) waiver”30 and
“eliminated suspension of deportation.”31 In addition to stripping
the Attorney General’s discretion, the IIRIRA also “dramatically
increased the grounds of removal, especially by expanding the definition of an ‘aggravated felony.’ ”32 These congressionally mandated reductions in discretionary relief mean that deportation “is
23. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361 (2010).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 362 (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)).
26. Id.
27. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1344
(2011).
28. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363.
29. Id.
30. The 212(c) waiver “allowed immigration judges to provide discretionary relief
to permanent residents facing deportation based on criminal convictions.” Fatma E.
Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the Reduction of Prejudice, 15
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 146-7 (2012).
31. Id. (explaining that the suspension of deportation was a “form of discretionary
relief that allowed an alien to remain in the U.S. by showing extreme hardship to
herself or to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child.”).
32. Id. at 135.
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now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted
of crimes.”33 It is in the context of this new system of “crimmigration” that Padilla’s immigration issues must be viewed to appreciate why the need for a case like Padilla is a relatively modern
phenomenon, and a departure from prior case law was
necessary.34

B.

Making Effective Assistance of Counsel Fit the
Modern Judiciary

Beginning with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gideon v.
Wainwright that “the Sixth Amendment grants an indigent defendant the right to state-appointed counsel in a criminal case,”35 the
last fifty years have seen an explosion of doctrinal law aimed at
defining exactly what protections the Sixth Amendment provides.
While Gideon focused not on the quality of the assistance of counsel, but rather on the right to have any counsel, most modern
arguments arising out of the Sixth Amendment focus on whether
the assistance was effective,36 and at what stage of proceedings
the right applies.37 Two things are clear in Sixth Amendment Doctrine: 1) “The right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel,” and 2) the “Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant
the right to have counsel present at all ’critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”38
Less clear is what counsel must do to be considered “effective”
and what constitutes a “critical stage.”39 As to the latter issue, the
Padilla court reemphasized its holding in Hill v. Lockhart that
“the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel.”40 The issue of “critical stage” was not in debate in
Padilla as the alleged instance of ineffectiveness arose from the
plea negotiation stage.41 Less clear, however, was whether the
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
33. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
34. Markowitz, supra note 27, at 1316.
35. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).
36. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
37. See generally Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52 (1985).
38. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.
778, 786 (2009) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).
39. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359-60 (2010).
40. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373.
41. Id. at 374.
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existed with regards to the deportation consequences arising from
a negotiated plea, because traditionally collateral consequences
(which most courts held deportation to be) were “outside the scope
of representation required by the Sixth Amendment.”42 Rather
than reaching the issue of whether deportation was a collateral
consequence, however, the court held instead that “advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”43 This allowed the Court to
sidestep the direct/collateral distinction, and instead proceed to its
analysis of what must be done with regards to warning of deportation consequences in order for counsel’s assistance to be deemed
effective.44
In Strickland v. Washington the United States Supreme
Court enunciated the two-prong test that courts use today to
determine whether a litigant is entitled to relief on a Sixth
Amendment effective assistance of counsel theory; the first prong
looks at whether the assistance was deficient and, if it was deficient, the second prong looks to whether the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency.45 Establishing that counsel was ineffective requires a showing “that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”46 The Supreme
Court has “recognized that [p]revailing norms of practice as
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . .
are guides to determining what is reasonable.”47 If the first prong
is met, courts proceed to the prejudice prong whereby they must
determine if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”48 It was under this analysis that the court in
Padilla, without reaching the prejudice prong, used the first prong
to enunciate the rule that, in order to be constitutionally sufficient, “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a
risk of deportation.”49

C.

A System of Pleas, Not of Trials

While thoughts of the criminal justice system conjure images
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (internal citations omitted).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356.
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of courtroom theatrics and climactic jury trials, in reality such
occurrences are the exception as opposed to the rule. Writing for
the majority in Lafler v. Cooper, Justice Kennedy commented,
“criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.”50 Supporting Kennedy’s position is the fact that
“[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”51 This shift
in the criminal adjudication process is not due to a mere coincidence, but rather is result of legislatively enacted longer sentences
that “exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes.”52 Given
this ideological shift, Kennedy rejected the argument that the
“guarantee of a fair trial [is] a backstop that inoculates any errors
in the pretrial process.”53 Kennedy analogized the modern plea
bargain construct to “horse trading between prosecutor and
defense counsel,” used to determine “who goes to jail and for how
long.”54 This modern system, as Kennedy noted, “often results in
individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences
than other individuals who are less morally culpable but take a
chance and go to trial.”55 This result is justified based on the fact
that defendants are able to mitigate the risks of long prison
sentences, while prosecutors are able to achieve higher conviction
rates than if all defendants proceeded to trial.56 Consequently, this
also means, however, that “the negotiation of a plea bargain,
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical
point for a defendant.”57
With the vast majority of criminal cases being resolved via
plea bargain, the judiciary has been left to grapple with the applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel to many proceedings ancillary to the trial itself.58 As Ken50. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
51. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.
J. 1909, 1909 (June 1992) (explaining “the parties to these settlements trade various
risks and entitlements: the defendant relinquishes the right to go to trial (along with
any chance of acquittal), while the prosecutor gives up the entitlement to seek the
highest sentence or pursue the most serious charges possible. . . . On the other hand,
everyone who pleads guilty is, by definition, convicted, while a substantial minority of
those who go to trial are acquitted.”) (footnote omitted).
57. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
58. See generally Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376; Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
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nedy pointed out, the plea bargain stage often will be the “only
stage when legal aid and advice would help” the accused.59 This
challenge extends not only to cases that result in a plea bargain,
but also to cases that proceed to trial because an agreed upon plea
agreement could not be reached.60 Also afoot are concerns regarding the voluntariness of pleas such that, when the court accepts
the pleas, the procedures used do not violate the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.61 As Justice
Scalia recognized in his dissent in Lafler v. Cooper, the Supreme
Court, for the last decade, has been developing “a whole new field
of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law,” in
its attempt to fit centuries old Constitutional protections into a
modern system of mass, plea-based adjudication.62 As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, “the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking
account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and determining sentences”; in addition to falling within
the immigration context, Padilla must also be viewed as a part of
this developing body of “plea-bargaining law.”63 It is this multidoctrinal aspect of Padilla that makes it such a fascinating, yet
confounding case.

D.

The Convergence in Padilla v. Kentucky

The facts giving rise to Padilla v. Kentucky are rather
straightforward. Jose Padilla was a native of Honduras who had
been a lawful permanent resident in the United States for more
than forty years.64 Mr. Padilla was arrested in Kentucky for transporting marijuana in his tractor-trailer65 and pleaded guilty to the
charges, making him automatically deportable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).66 Mr. Padilla sought post-conviction relief with
the Kentucky Supreme Court, arguing ineffective assistance of
counsel because he “relied on his counsel’s erroneous advice when
he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation
59. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
60. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386 (Stevens, J., explaining that “even if the trial itself is
free from constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a more
favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious counts or
the imposition of a more severe sentence.”).
61. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 391 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
62. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
63. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
64. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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virtually mandatory.”67 Mr. Padilla alleged that his counsel “not
only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering
the plea, but also told him that he did not have to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”68
The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Mr. Padilla’s post-conviction relief without evidentiary hearing, basing its decision on
the premise that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from
erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.”69 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether Mr.
Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise Padilla that his
pleading guilty would result in automatic deportation.70 The court
agreed “with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel
would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution
made him subject to automatic deportation”; however, the Court
did not reach the issue of whether Mr. Padilla had been prejudiced
by counsel’s ineffectiveness as it had not been passed on by the
court below, and instead left this issue for the Kentucky courts to
decide on remand.71
The court’s decision was founded on the rationale that deportation arising out of a criminal conviction is ill-suited to be categorized as either a direct or collateral consequence, therefore “advice
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”72 The Court extended
its holding, that “to satisfy this responsibility [of effective assistance] . . . counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries
a risk of deportation,” to both cases where there is affirmative
misadvise and cases where counsel fails to warn of deportation
risks.73 While the Court relied on the Sixth Amendment in reaching its decision, the case had implications far beyond the right to
effective assistance of counsel.74 Padilla v. Kentucky represents
the convergence of several bodies of law into one complex decision:
Sixth Amendment IAC doctrine,75 “plea-bargaining law,”76 immi67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 359-60.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 370-74.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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gration doctrine,77 and voluntariness doctrine under Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.78

III. STATEMENT
A.

OF THE

CASE

The Majority

Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in Padilla v.
Kentucky, and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor. The decision also included a concurrence by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and, as all truly significant Supreme Court decisions should, a dissent penned by Justice
Scalia, to which Justice Thomas joined. While there were some
points of commonality between the Justices, the methodologies
used could not have been more divergent. Despite the conflict
amongst the Justices, the Court managed to assemble a five-member majority to enunciate the rule that “Padilla was constitutionally entitled to advice from his lawyer that pleading guilty would
make him deportable.”79
The majority opinion seemed to recognize the fact that the
Padilla case implicated much more than a run-of-the-mill Strickland case would, acknowledging that the case concerned “Sixth
Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country.”80 Because of the
multitude of issues wrapped into one case, the Court had to not
only address each issue, but also attempt to do so in a way that
would not undermine the doctrinal law currently in place in each
respective area of the law. Perhaps in an attempt to corral the
reach of the Court’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
holdings in the case, Justice Stevens began the majority opinion
with a discourse of “landscape of federal immigration law,”81 ultimately concluding that “changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”82
After meticulously detailing the changes in the immigration
law over the last half-century, Justice Stevens used these changes
to justify the position of the Court that “as a matter of federal law,
77. Markowitz, supra note 27, at 1334.
78. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
79. Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky:
From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 101 (2011).
80. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
81. Id. at 360.
82. Id. at 364.
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deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”83 The Stevensled majority then turned its attention to the argument that deportation warnings do not qualify for effective assistance of counsel
because they are “collateral consequences.” The Court concluded
that because “deportation is a particularly severe penalty,” advice
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”84 By refusing to analyze
the case through a collateral consequences lens, Stevens essentially merged the IAC issues, the deportation issues, and the plea
bargain issues into one question that the Court could address:
In providing the effective assistance guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, does defense counsel never have a duty
to investigate and advise a noncitizen client whether the
offense to which he is pleading guilty will result in his
deportation?85
After consolidating the issues into one that could be addressed
simultaneously, the court undertook a prong-one Strickland analysis with regards to Mr. Padilla’s case.
The Court Padilla, using a Strickland analysis, focused only
on the first prong of the test, which asks, “whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”86
In holding that Mr. Padilla’s counsel’s representation did fall
below this objective standard of reasonableness, the Court gave
Constitutional teeth to an obligation of competent legal counsel
that “professional norms have required for at least the last two
decades.”87 Even though these professional norms had existed for
quite some time, the Court, nonetheless, held in a subsequent
opinion that Padilla announced a new rule.88 The Court reasoned
that the rule of Padilla, that “the failure to advise about a noncriminal consequence could violate the Sixth Amendment[,] would
not have been—in fact, was not—‘apparent to all reasonable
jurists prior to our decision.’ ”89 The impact of this new rule on
accused noncitizens in future proceedings should not be under83. Id.
84. Id. at 366.
85. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at i, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
(No. 08-651).
86. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
87. Sharpless & Stanton, supra note 3.
88. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
89. Id. at 1111 (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518 (1997)).
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stated, as the Padilla opinion requires “defense attorneys to counsel their noncitizen clients about the immigration consequences of
a plea.”90
The Court did not however, address the question presented in
the second Strickland prong—whether Mr. Padilla could “demonstrate prejudice as a result” of counsel’s representation falling
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and instead left
this issue for the Kentucky Supreme Court to decide on remand.91
The Court did note that for Mr. Padilla to meet the second prong
he would have to show that “a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.”92 Given that
the issue before the Court in Padilla dealt only with the first
prong of Strickland, it is unsurprising that the Court did not
address the issue of prejudice. While in theory, noncitizen defendants in this post-Padilla legal landscape should be advised about
the deportation consequences of accepting a plea bargain, Padilla
itself does little for those individuals who do not receive the Constitutionally mandated level of advisement. Thus, if there is a
breakdown in the process and an attorney fails to meet his professional obligation of advising his client about the deportation consequences of entering into a plea agreement, it is going to be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the aggrieved noncitizen
defendant to obtain any relief through post-conviction
proceedings.
In answering the question of whether the failure of counsel to
advise a noncitizen of the deportation consequences of a plea came
within Strickland’s first prong, the Court left a trail of precedents
and ambiguities that have led to the difficulties that this paper’s
analysis will discuss in greater detail. The rules articulated in
Padilla include: 1) counsel has a duty “to provide her client with
available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to
do so clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis,”93
2) “[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward a criminal
defense attorney” must “advise a noncitizen client that pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences,94” 3) “when the deportation consequence is truly clear . . .
90. Sharpless & Stanton, supra note 3.
91. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
92. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 480, 486 (2000)).
93. Id. at 371 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985)).
94. Id. at 369.
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the duty to give correct advice is equally clear,95” and 4) “a distinction between direct and collateral consequences” will not be used
“to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional
assistance required under Strickland.”96

B.

Justice Alito’s Concurrence

In his concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Alito “grudgingly recognized a lawyer’s duty to warn the client
that a guilty plea ‘may have adverse immigration consequences.’”97 Though he adopted the decision of the majority, Justice Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion because he was
“worried that this obligation might apply to ‘a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing” about which
criminal defense lawyers have little or no expertise.”98 The only
requirement that the concurrence would have imparted on attorneys is that they must “(1) refrain from unreasonably providing
incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if
the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an
immigration attorney.”99 Justice Alito found the majority’s decision to be a “vague, halfway test [that would] lead to much confusion and needless litigation.”100
Alito’s concern came about because of what he viewed as the
majority’s abrogation of the unanimous rule of federal courts that
counsel “generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.”101 Justice Alito viewed the collateral consequence rule as demonstrating what he referred to as “an
important truth,” that:
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the
conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not expected to
possess—and very often do not possess—expertise in other
areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of
training and experience.102
Alito argued that there are many consequences that are serious,
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 365.
Love, supra note 79, at 104.
Id.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375 (Alito, J. concurring).
Id.
Id. at 375-376.
Id. at 376.

\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL103.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 15

THE PADILLA WRECKING BALL

12-FEB-14

11:31

235

but that do not necessarily implicate Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.103
An area of agreement between the concurrence and majority
is the fact that determining which crimes are or are not deportable
offenses is extremely difficult. Justice Alito pointed to the fact that
“[d]efense counsel who consults a guidebook on whether a particular crime is an “aggravated felony” will often find that the answer
is not “easily ascertained.”104 Alito was very concerned, however,
about the burden the majority was placing on counsel by finding
that, depending on how difficult the immigration consequences
were to ascertain, the Sixth Amendment required a warning in an
area that is so confusing and convoluted.105 He found four problematic points about the varying requirement rule enunciated by the
majority: 1) “it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular
statutory provision is succinct, clear, and explicit,” 2) “if defense
counsel must provide advice regarding only one of the many collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are
likely to be misled,” 3) “the Court’s rigid constitutional rule could
inadvertently head off more promising ways of addressing the
underlying problem—such as statutory or administrative reforms
requiring trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a
guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences,” and 4)
the fact that “[t]his Court decided Strickland in 1984, but the
majority does not cite a single case, from this or any other federal
court, holding that criminal defense counsel’s failure to provide
advice concerning the removal consequences of a criminal conviction violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”106
In Alito’s view, the majority opinion represented a dramatic
expansion “of the scope of criminal defense counsel’s duties under
the Sixth Amendment.”107 Despite disagreeing with the sheer
scope of the majority’s holding, Justice Alito did concur with the
opinion that the Sixth Amendment was implicated where counsel
gives affirmative misadvice, or fails to give advice where he realizes that his client is a noncitizen, and that a conviction may have
an impact on his immigration status.108 The concurrence would
have tailored a much narrower rule whereby a noncitizen defendant’s “Sixth Amendment right to counsel [would be] satisfied if
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 376.
Padilla, 599 U.S. at 376-77.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 381-83
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defense counsel advises the client that a conviction may have
immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized
field, that the attorney is not an immigration lawyer, and that the
client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants
advice on that subject.”109

C.

Scalia’s Dissent: Staunch Conservativeness or
Practical Reasoning?

True to his conservative roots, Justice Scalia thought that the
judiciary should not interfere in the Padilla case, and instead
leave it to Congress. Like Alito’s concurrence, Justice Scalia’s dissent dismissed the majority’s description of deportation as
“unique,” and expressed concern over the ability to limit the holding to ones like the case at issue.110 Where Justices Scalia and
Thomas differed from the concurring Justices was in the fact that
Scalia and Thomas did not believe that counsel had any constitutional duty to advise noncitizen clients of immigration implications, and rather thought if that duty rested anywhere it was with
the courts.111 Justice Scalia found the majority to be reading the
Constitution to fit the needs of the case, and likened the majority’s
constitutional construction to “swinging a sledge where a tack
hammer is needed.”112 While the conclusion of Justice Scalia’s dissent is out of touch with the realities of the modern criminal justice system that Stevens detailed, his reasons for objecting to the
use of the Sixth Amendment as the tool by which the majority
crafted the Padilla decision are the same reasons that Padilla has
little effectiveness in the post-conviction context.
Justice Scalia’s first sentence after his introductory paragraph is very telling with regards to how he viewed this case.
Scalia proffered “[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused
a lawyer ‘for his defense’ against a ‘criminal prosecutio[n]’—not
for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction.”113 This sentence would suggest that Justice Scalia read the
majority’s opinion the same way that Justice Alito did; Scalia all
but acknowledged that he viewed the Padilla case as standing for
the proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel can be based
on collateral consequences. Though the majority sought for
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 387.
Love, supra note 79, at 104.
Id. at 104-105.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Id.
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Padilla to have a limited reach, Scalia envisioned a new post-conviction landscape where defense attorneys would constantly concoct new Sixth Amendment omissions to invalidate pleas.114 After
implying that he questioned the validity of Gideon v. Wainwright
and Strickland v. Washington,115 Scalia argued that the effective
assistance of counsel doctrine should not be extended beyond its
textual limitations to criminal proceedings as “[t]here is no basis
in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required
advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to
the criminal prosecution at hand.”116 While this paper does not
address whether retreating from the collateral consequences doctrine would be a beneficial or detrimental shift in IAC jurisprudence, the Court was clearly trying to limit this case’s impact on
the collateral consequence doctrine, stating only that the “collateral versus direct distinction is ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.”117 Scalia,
like Justice Alito, did not believe however, that the majority could
reach the result that it did without implicating the collateral consequence doctrine. Regardless of the majority’s intent, by basing
its holding solely on the Sixth Amendment, the majority in
Padilla, as one commentator noted, arguably “ripped the foundations” from the collateral/direct consequence distinction and
“effectively undermined any future application of the ‘collateral/
direct’ consequences distinction in the Sixth Amendment
context.”118
Before concluding his dissent, Justice Scalia alluded to the
fact that a concern about voluntariness “properly relates to the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
not to the Sixth Amendment.”119 While correct, Scalia’s admission
114. Id. at 391 (Scalia proffered that the Padilla decision would lead to “years of
elaboration upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense bar’s
devising of ever-expanding categories of plea-invalidating misadvise and failures to
warn.”).
115. Id. at 389 (“even assuming the validity of these holdings. . .”).
116. Id. at 390.
117. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 (the Court noted further that “the collateralconsequences rule expresses an important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have
expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not expected to
possess—and very often do not possess—expertise in other areas of the law, and it is
unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie outside their
area of training and experience.”).
118. McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L. J.
795, 798 (2011).
119. Padilla, 559 U.S. 392 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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was odd in the sense that Mr. Padilla did not raise a voluntariness
argument, and neither the majority nor the concurrence did more
than mention voluntariness in passing. Scalia seemed to try to
qualify that comment in a footnote by indicating that he “did not
mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely provide
relief.”120 But even his footnote leaves one to wonder whether this
statement provides evidence of something greater than a mere
dismissal of the concurring opinion by Justice Alito. Adding to the
level of curiosity created by Scalia’s mention of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process was the final sentence in the footnote, which read “[w]hatever the outcome, however, the effect of
misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a
guilty plea should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause.”121
While Scalia’s opinion in dissent aligned with his reputation as
being one of the “most politically conservative Justices on the
United States Supreme Court,”122 and one “hostile to the rights of
criminal defendants,”123 his opinion may also have cracked the
door to a different methodology that could be used to address the
post-conviction issues left unresolved in the wake of Padilla v.
Kentucky.

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Padilla’s Flaws: What Hindsight Has Shown Us
About the True Impact of the Decision in the PostConviction Context

1. Florida: A Post-Padilla Post-Conviction Case Study
While both state and federal jurisdictions around the country
have varied in their treatment of cases implicating Padilla issues
in the post-conviction context, Florida illustrates almost perfectly
the difficulties facing noncitizen defendants seeking post-conviction relief based upon the Padilla decision. Up until November of
2012,124 depending on the Florida district that a noncitizen defendant found himself in, his Padilla protections would vary dramatically. Just as Mr. Padilla had to prove prejudice once his case was
remanded to Kentucky, Florida litigants must prove prejudice as
120. Id. at 391 n.1.
121. Id.
122. Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Justice Scalia For The Defense?, 40 U. BALT. L. REV.
687 (2011).
123. Id.
124. See Hernandez v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S 730, 2012 FLA. LEXIS 2416 (Fla.
Nov. 21, 2012).
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well; however, in many Florida districts a litigant was per se not
prejudiced when he entered, and the court accepted, his plea.125
The following discussion of the Florida courts’ struggles to uniformly apply the Supreme Court’s mandate in Padilla v. Kentucky
is intended to illustrate just how problematic of a decision it really
is when it comes to individuals seeking post-conviction relief.
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the
magnitude of the impacts that deportation can have on a litigant,
multiple Florida districts, up until recently,126 had been able to
virtually neutralize Padilla’s impact in the post-conviction context. In concluding that Mr. Padilla did not receive his constitutionally protected right to the effective assistance of counsel,
Justice Stevens stated that “[t]he severity of deportation—the
‘equivalent of banishment or exile,’—only underscores how critical
it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk
of deportation.”127 While this language suggests that the Padilla
majority’s objective was to ensure that all noncitizen defendants
be made aware of the risk of deportation prior to pleading, the fact
that the Strickland/Hill two-part test is the measure by which
ineffective assistance is determined has made obtaining relief
under Padilla, where a noncitizens defendant was not advised of
the deportation consequences prior to accepting a plea bargain,
virtually impossible. Case-in-point is the now-reversed Florida
Fourth District Court of Appeal case, which held that the
prejudice-prong of the Strickland test could never be met under a
Padilla rationale as long as the litigant was given a generic warning by the court because “the court’s Rule 3.172(c)(8) deportation
warning in the plea colloquy cures any prejudice arising from
counsel’s alleged misadvice.”128 Thus, prior to Flores v. State being
overruled by the Florida Supreme Court, a noncitizen defendant
in the Florida Fourth District could NEVER succeed on a Padilla
post-conviction claim, as long the court gave the deportation warning found in Rule 3.172(c)(8).129
It was at the time of the Flores decision, and still is, the stan125. See Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
126. See generally Hernandez, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S 730, 2012 FLA. LEXIS 2416.
127. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74, 1486 (2010) (citations omitted).
128. See generally Flores, 57 So. 3d at 218 (Reversed by Hernandez, 37 Fla. L.
Weekly S 730, 2012 FLA. LEXIS 2416).
129. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8) instructs that the trial court must warn the
defendant “that if he or she pleads guilty or nolo contendere, if he or she is not a
United States citizen, the plea may subject him or her to deportation pursuant to the
laws and regulations governing the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service. It shall not be necessary for the trial judge to inquire as to whether the
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dard procedure in all Florida plea colloquies for the court to give
the deportation warning, whether it is of any relevance or not, in
order to insulate the pleas from post-sentencing attack via Rule
3.850 motion.130 Thus, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
was able to render meaningless the holding in Padilla v. Kentucky
for those noncitizen defendants that had already entered into plea
agreements and been sentenced. For individuals seeking post-conviction relief, Padilla was reduced from a landmark IAC case to a
mere glimmer of hope for relief on the off chance that the trial
court judge failed to hurriedly read a standardized warning that
the defendant “may” be subject to deportation. Then, even if the
judge failed to give the deportation warning, these noncitizens
would still have had to show, based on the Padilla opinion itself,
that “a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances.”131 The Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal was not alone in its treatment of prejudice-prong
Padilla inquiries, and in fact, many other state and federal courts
that have considered issues similar to those in Flores have “considered the plea colloquy to be significant, if not controlling, evidence weighing against a finding of prejudice.”132
Illustrating the lack of a coherent prejudice-prong framework
in the post-Padilla legal landscape, and in contrast to the Fourth
District’s approach to the prejudice prong under a Strickland/
Padilla analysis, the Florida Third District held that a plea colloquy warning does not cure all prejudice. The court reasoned
“Padilla does not turn on the fact that the Kentucky trial court
and plea colloquy failed to include a ‘may subject you to deportation’ type of warning.”133 In Hernandez v. State, the Third District
defendant is a United States citizen, as this admonition shall be given to all
defendants in all cases.”
130. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 states that the “following grounds may be claims for
relief from judgment or release from custody by a person who has been tried and
found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere before a court
established by the laws of Florida: (1) The judgment was entered or sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of
Florida. (2) The court did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment. (3) The court
did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence. (4) The sentence exceeded the
maximum authorized by law. (5) The plea was involuntary. (6) The judgment or
sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
131. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486
(2000)).
132. Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings
on Defendants’ Ability To Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L. J. 944, 975
(2012).
133. Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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departed from its sister court in the Fourth District because of the
“significant change in this body of law, and in criminal practice”
caused by the Padilla decision.134 The effect of the divergent interpretations of Padilla by the Florida Third and Fourth Districts
meant that a defendant in the Fourth District could have been
affirmatively misadvised about the deportation consequences of a
plea, yet unable to obtain any relief provided that the standard
plea colloquy warning was given; however, the same defendant
would have been able to have his plea vacated in the Third District, provided that he could show that “a decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances.”135
In November of 2012, the Florida Supreme Court settled the
conflict between the Third and Fourth Districts’ interpretations
when it issued, by per curium opinion, its ruling in Hernandez v.
State.136 Answering the questions certified to be of great public
importance, the court adopted the Third District’s view of the
issue, holding first, “the trial court’s warning to a defendant that
‘the plea may subject him or her to deportation,’ as required by
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8), does not preclude
a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel,” and second, “the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla does not apply
retroactively.”137 The court reasoned that while “the colloquy
required by rule 3.172(c)(8) may refute a defendant’s post-conviction claim that he had no knowledge that a plea could have possible immigration consequences . . . it cannot by itself refute a claim
that he was unaware of presumptively mandatory consequences.”138 In upholding the Third District’s interpretation, the
Florida Supreme Court ensured that a generic, equivocal warning
would not be allowed circumvent Padilla’s purpose, which was to
“ensure ‘accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes,’
and to bring ‘informed consideration of possible deportation into
the plea-bargaining process.’ ”139
In resolving the Florida circuit split, the Florida Supreme
Court’s basis for doing so was the equivocality of the warning contained in Rule 3.172(c)(8). The Florida Supreme Court, as have
134. Id.
135. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486
(2000)).
136. Hernandez, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S 730, 2012 FLA. LEXIS 2416 (Nov. 21, 2012).
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 10-11.
139. Id. at 12.
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the majority of state and federal courts that have examined similar warnings, “focused on the generic and indefinite character of
the warnings given, in contrast to the specific warning required
under Padilla in cases of mandatory deportation.”140 The focus of
these inquires suggests that a definite, unequivocal judicial warning may suffice to bring about a per se presumption of lack of
prejudice. Further, the Florida Supreme Court made abundantly
clear that even equivocal warnings like the one in the plea “colloquy required by rule 3.172(c)(8) may refute a defendant’s post-conviction claim that he had no knowledge that a plea could have
possible immigration consequences.”141 Similar cases that severely
limit Padilla’s reach in the post-conviction context are likely to
recur as long as Sixth Amendment IAC claims are the only potential avenues to relief that noncitizen defendants have at their disposal if they unknowingly sign away their right to remain in the
United States of America as part of a plea bargain.
The protection that the majority in Padilla sought to provide
was not only a noble one, but was, in this author’s opinion, necessary in light of the 1996 “changes to our immigration law [that]
dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”142 But as Justice Scalia stated, “[t]he Constitution . . . is not
an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and
when we ignore its text in order to make it that, we often find
ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.”143 In
Padilla, the Court appears to have been forced to swing an ineffective assistance of counsel constitutional sledge because the case
involved several, overlapping issues, to wit, the Court’s “longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant
impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country
demand.”144 By use of its IAC sledge, however, the Court, contrary
to its own intent, arguably “ripped the foundations” from the collateral/direct consequence distinction and “effectively undermined
any future application of the ‘collateral/direct’ consequences distinction in the Sixth Amendment context.”145
Justice Scalia’s belief, that judicial intervention was unneces140. Lang, supra note 132, at 978.
141. Hernandez v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S 730, 2012 FLA. LEXIS 2416, at *10
(Fla. Nov. 21, 2012).
142. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
143. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
144. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
145. See Smyth, supra, note 118.
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sary in Padilla, shows a lack of appreciation for the modern concerns resulting from the evolution of America’s immigration
system, which Justice Stevens methodically outlined in the majority opinion. Be that as it may, Justice Scalia was correct in his
assessment that “[s]tatutory provisions [could have] remed[ied]
these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing
permanent, and legislatively irreparable, overkill.”146 In fact, one
could advance a serious argument that all that was really needed
was a legislative tack hammer in the form of legislation reinstating JRAD.147 This is not to say that requiring attorneys to advise
their clients about the deportation consequences of entering pleas
is not a critically important objective, and one that the Court
should absolutely require. Given Justice Stevens’ long dissertation regarding the legislative actions that have led us to this point
in our immigration system’s evolution, however, it would appear
that the Court was acting, at least in part, to protect noncitizens
that have already unknowingly signed away their right to remain
in the U.S. If this immensely important social objective was, in
fact, part of what the Court sought to protect in Padilla, and the
Court continues to rely solely on Sixth Amendment IAC methodology, results like those observed in Florida are likely to recur in
multiple jurisdictions, and in a variety of forms. Noncitizen
defendants who receive constitutionally deficient advisement
essentially have no remedy in the event that they are aggrieved.
While Padilla should help to ensure that fewer individuals end up
in Mr. Padilla’s position in the first place, the decision fails to provide a viable source of relief for individuals who do end up in situations similar to Mr. Padilla’s.

2. Prejudice? What Prejudice?
Because Padilla was decided using a Strickland/Hill analysis, even once a Defendant is able to assert a Padilla ineffective
assistance of counsel claim—in the sense that Strickland’s first
prong is met—the defendant must still make a showing of
prejudice to obtain relief.148 Because “[i]t takes two prongs to make
a successful ineffective-assistance claim,” the only way to create “a
well-developed precedential body of law about failures-to-warn”
would be for “at least some defendants [to] manage to get past the
146. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 389 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
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high hurdle of the prejudice prong.”149 While there may be an occasional case in which the prejudice hurdle is cleared, such cases
will presumably be few and between. In fact, even after the United
States Supreme Court’s issued its decision in Padilla it remained
unclear as to whether the decision would actually enable Mr.
Padilla to have his conviction vacated on remand.150 If Padilla
truly was a landmark “immigration case”—as opposed to an IAC
or plea bargain case—an outcome in which Mr. Padilla is unable
to obtain relief, despite having (1) received constitutionally deficient counsel, and (2) having been deported as a result thereof,
would seem counter-intuitive. The mere possibility of such a seemingly pervert result is illustrative of the difficulties that individuals who do not receive immigration advice face, and is the result of
using an imperfect IAC tool to both prevent future wrongs from
occurring, and remedy wrongs that have already occurred.
While Mr. Padilla was, as we now know, able to have his plea
vacated upon remand to Kentucky,151 such a result was anything
but clear prior to the Kentucky Court of Appeals actually issuing
its opinion. The United States Supreme Court, because of the limited scope of the issue that it was presented for review, expressed
no opinion as to whether or not Mr. Padilla had put forth a showing of prejudice sufficient to be entitled to Strickland/Hill relief.
The court stated, “[w]hether Padilla is entitled to relief will
depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result [of
counsel’s ineffectiveness], a question we do not reach because it
was not passed on below.”152 On remand, due to the applicability of
IAC claims in the context of an attorney’s failure to adequately
advise his or her client of the deportation consequences of entering
into a negotiated plea, Mr. Padilla would have to meet the Hill v.
Lockhart standard for establishing prejudice. In order for Mr.
Padilla to satisfy the prejudice requirement, he would have to
“show that there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.”153 Such “predictions of the outcome at a
149. Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 709-10
(2011).
150. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. 2012); See, e.g., Roberts,
supra, note 149, at 719.
151. It is worth noting that Kentucky Supreme Court review is still a viable option
because, at the time of this paper, the case has only made its way through the court of
appeals. See generally Padilla, 381 S.W. 3d 322.
152. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374-75.
153. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
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possible trial,” however, “should be made objectively, without
regard for the ‘idiosyncrasies of the particular decision maker.’ ”154
Due to the objective nature of this inquiry, Mr. Padilla would have
to “convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.”155
While it is improbable that anyone would call Mr. Padilla
“lucky,”156 the facts of his case perfectly enabled him to satisfy the
Hill standard by making an objective showing that “a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”157 In addressing Mr. Padilla’s prejudice-prong showing, the Kentucky Court of Appeals first went through the specific
facts of Mr. Padilla’s case, which it would weigh in deciding
whether “reject[ing] the plea offer and insist[ing] on a trial would
have been rational under the circumstances.”158 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals relied heavily on the following factors in reaching its conclusion that rejecting the plea would have been rational:
1) “Padilla testified that he had no knowledge that he was
transporting boxes of marijuana,”159
2) “[Mr. Padilla] had no right to inspect the load’s contents
and checked only for its quantity and weight,”160
3) “Padilla testified that he pleaded guilty only because his
wife, Ingrid, and daughter, Yoshii, were distraught over his
potential prison sentence,”161
4) “When asked if he would have pleaded guilty if he had
been properly informed that he would be deported, Padilla
responded that he would have insisted on a trial because
deportation was the same as ‘putting a gun’ to his head,”162
5) “Ingrid testified that she spoke to Padilla’s trial counsel
regarding Padilla’s possible deportation and he informed
her that deportation was not an issue because of Padilla’s
military service and he had lived in the United States for
154. Id. at 59-60 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
155. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 480, 486 (2000)).
156. See generally Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374-75 (Mr. Padilla was caught with a load
of marijuana, spent the ten years of his life trying to fight deportation, and, not only
had counsel that not only failed to advise him of the deportation consequences, also
had a deal that the Kentucky Court of Appeals criticized as not being a good deal).
157. Id. at 372
158. Padilla, 381 S.W.3d at 328.
159. Id. at 327.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 328.
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over forty years,”163
6) Padilla’s wife “testified that on the trial date, Padilla’s
trial counsel urged her to persuade Padilla to accept the
plea offer [but] . . . [i]f she had been informed that Padilla
would be deported, she would have advised him to reject
the offer,”164 and
7) “Padilla’s plea bargain was not as favorable as he
believed.”165

All of these factors heavily pointed in favor of the court’s finding
that it would have been rational for Mr. Padilla to reject his plea
offer and proceed to trial.
The facts of Mr. Padilla’s case set it apart from the vast
majority of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the immigration realm. It is likely that most noncitizen defendants would put
forth similar arguments to those relied on by Mr. Padilla, and
would have family or friends testify that, but for a deficient deportation warning, the defendant would have proceeded to trial.
While the court certainly took these factors into account, and such
factual assertions are, ostensibly, necessary to obtain Padilla
relief,166 they do not appear to be the factors that carried the day
in the Padilla decision. The test for establishing whether a defendant was prejudiced focuses on whether there exists “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors,” he would have refused
to “plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”167 The
crux of the Kentucky court’s decision, however, seemed to be Mr.
Padilla’s probability of success had he gone to trial, combined with
his unusually harsh sentence and immigration consequences. The
Kentucky Court noted that, “although not the exclusive factor
when determining whether a particular defendant’s decision to
insist on a trial would have been rational, the immigration consequences of a guilty plea can be the predominate factor.”168
While Mr. Padilla was able to show prejudice, this does not
ameliorate the fact that, because Padilla v. Kentucky was decided
by extending the IAC doctrine to constitutionally require counsel
to advise noncitizen defendants about the deportation conse163. Id.
164. Padilla, 381 S.W.3d at 328.
165. Id. at 330.
166. Id. at 328 (these factors all support the requirement that “Padilla had to
demonstrate that he rationally would have insisted on a trial, not that an acquittal at
trial was likely.”).
167. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
168. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 329.
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quences of their plea, the prejudice analysis will almost always
render the Padilla decision a non-starter in the post-conviction
context. In fact, a closer reading of the Kentucky Court of Appeals’
decision reveals that Mr. Padilla’s case was an exceptional one
factually. First, the court found that a “reasonable jury could find
that Padilla was unaware that the load he transported contained
marijuana and acquit him of the deportable offense.”169 Because
the trafficking offense for which Mr. Padilla was charged required
a “knowingly” mens rea,170 his defense, that as a truck driver he
did not know what cargo he was carrying, was actually a plausible
one. Many defendants charged with drug possession surely assert
a similar defense, but the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly approved of Mr. Padilla’s argument as a viable defense
to knowingly—one that applies specifically to delivery drivers—
delivering cargo that turns out to be contraband.171 This fact
weighed heavily in favor of the view that, from a probability of
success standpoint, Mr. Padilla’s decision to proceed to trial would
have been rational.
The second factor that made Padilla an exceptional case—one
arguably even more important than Mr. Padilla’s probability of
success—was the fact that his “plea bargain was not as favorable
as he believed.”172 The court illustrated the plea’s lack of
favorability to Mr. Padilla as follows:
Although, if tried and convicted, he faced a maximum of
ten-years’ incarceration, under the plea agreement he was
sentenced to ten-years’ imprisonment, with five years to
serve and five years probated. Based on the testimony at
the RCr 11.42 hearing, Padilla accepted the offer on the day
of trial only because he believed he would be not be
deported and released on parole. However, Padilla would
later learn that he faced deportation, was not eligible for
parole, and was required to serve his entire sentence.173

Mr. Padilla, in effect, accepted the highest possible sentence that
he could have received had he proceeded to trial and been found
guilty. Thus, Mr. Padilla, in a very literal sense, would have had
169. Id. at 330.
170. Id. at 330 n.3.
171. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (holding “a
Federal Express courier who delivers a box in which the shipper has declared the
contents to be ‘film’” does not “‘knowingly transports’ such film” if it turns out to be
contraband).
172. Padilla, 381 S.W.3d at 330.
173. Id.
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nothing to lose had he gone to trial. He was essentially left to
choose between the following two options: First, proceed to trial
where he could possibly receive a sentence of ten years in prison
and deportation, but with at least a chance of acquittal whereby
he would not be deported; or Second, accept the plea and receive
ten years in prison and automatic deportation with no chance of
acquittal or the ability to remain in the United States.
Hindsight reveals that Mr. Padilla’s counsel’s poorly negotiated plea agreement left Mr. Padilla with a Hobson’s choice.
Because Mr. Padilla lacked more than one viable option, and the
United States Supreme Court did not reach the prejudice issue
“because it was not passed on below,”174 the outcome of Padilla has
no precedential value with regards to post-conviction prejudice
prong jurisprudence. This is hardly a surprise given that Padilla
was a prong-one Strickland/Hill case. That being said, the factual exceptionalness of Padilla’s case has left states and lower federal courts to grapple with what sort of facts are needed to satisfy
the prejudice requirement in a deportation warning based IAC
claim.175 In a world of mass-plea bargaining, Padilla is not the
norm; rather, most litigants who choose to reject plea bargains
risk “huge penalties [by] going to trial.”176 But in Padilla’s case, the
plea that he accepted was in conflict with the presumption that
the “ ‘mutuality of advantage’ supposedly makes plea bargaining
rational, fair, and efficient.”177 Mr. Padilla’s plea was anything but
fair and rational; rather, it supports those who reject the assumption that “good information and competent counsel would suffice
to ensure rational, orderly, trial-based bargaining.”178 While Justice Stevens was of the opinion that lower courts would have little
difficulty in undertaking run-of-the-mill prong-two prejudice analyses,179 the “severity of deportation—“the equivalent of banishment or exile,” adds a unique new counterweight onto the scales of
justice that are used to undertake prong-two Strickland/Hill
174. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
175. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); contra
Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
176. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating The Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011).
177. Id. at 1124.
178. Id. at 1127.
179. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (“There is no reason to doubt
that lower courts—now quite experienced with applying Strickland—can effectively
and efficiently use its framework to separate specious claims from those with
substantial merit.”).
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analyses.180
While the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ decision certainly
benefitted Mr. Padilla, a question remains as to how the court
would have dealt with cases like the ones that the Florida districts
split over.181 How would the Kentucky court, or any other lower
court applying Padilla, have dealt with Gabriel A. Hernandez?
Mr. Hernandez sold LSD to a confidential informant, but pled out
to only “one year of probation (with a possibility of termination
after six months), completion of a substance abuse assessment
and any recommended treatment, and the payment of $ 451.00 in
costs” when he was facing a “maximum sentence of fifteen years in
state prison.”182 Given that Mr. Hernandez received only six
months of probation when he was facing fifteen years in prison,
would it “have been rational under the circumstances” for him to
have rejected the plea bargain if he had been informed about the
deportation consequence?183 Would the fact that Mr. Hernandez,
just nineteen years old, was “born in Nicaragua, but entered the
United States with his mother when he was under two years of
age” be enough to tip the prejudice inquiry in his favor?184
How would the Kentucky court on remand have dealt with
Jose Martinez Flores, who was charged with possession of cocaine
and DUI and was facing a maximum sentence of five years but
“entered a negotiated plea to a lesser misdemeanor offense of possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to time
served.”185 Like Mr. Hernandez, Mr. Flores’s actual sentence was
very lenient compared to what he was facing with regards to the
potential prison sentence. Thus, how would a lower court decide if
it would “have been rational under the circumstances” for Mr. Flores to have rejected the plea bargain if he had been informed
about the deportation consequence?186 Does the fact that Mr. Flores, a Mexican citizen, “married his [American] wife in 2001 about
seven years before the hearing,”187 tip the prejudice scale in his
favor? Or perhaps the fact that Mr. Flores and his wife have three
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Hernandez, 61 So. 3d 1144; contra Flores, 57 So. 3d 218.
182. Hernandez, 61 So. 3d at 1146.
183. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486
(2000)).
184. Hernandez, 61 So. 3d at 1146.
185. Flores, 57 So. 3d at 218; FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(d) and 893.13(6)(a).
186. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486
(2000)).
187. Flores, 57 So. 3d 218, n.2.

\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL103.txt

250

unknown

Seq: 30

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

12-FEB-14

11:31

[Vol. 45:1

children together is enough to show that it would have been
rational to reject the plea?
While Justice Stevens was correct in that lower courts are
“now quite experienced with applying Strickland,” his statement
fails to account for the fact that deportation is a “unique . . . [and]
‘particularly severe’ penalty.”188 Further, prior to the Court’s decision in Padilla, “only two state courts held that an attorney could
violate the Sixth Amendment by failing to inform a client about
deportation risks or other collateral consequences of a guilty
plea.”189 Given that courts by and large lack experience in applying
Strickland’s prong-two analysis, it is not surprising that the Florida District Courts of Appeal courts reached opposite results in
Flores and Hernandez. These cases provide much more common
examples of the plea-bargain process, and are indicative of the
system whereby “prosecutors threaten inflated post-trial
sentences to induce pleas” and “defendants are less free to test
their guilt at trial.”190 But in cases like these, lower courts are still
in the dark as to how a prong-two prejudice analysis should be
conducted in the Padilla context. Can a noncitizen defendant ever
succeed in a prong-two prejudice inquiry if, rather than serving
time in prison, they just receive probation? What if they are married and their spouse is a U.S. citizens? What if they own a business in the United States? What if they have children who are
American citizens by virtue of having been born in the United
States to an American mother? Lower courts have less experience
in dealing with these issues than Justice Stevens suggests
because, prior to Padilla, these issues were never factors that
would be weighed in an IAC prong-two prejudice inquiry. Thus,
these questions will linger, and circuit splits are likely, until congressional or judicial action addresses the prong-two prejudice
issues in the immigration context.
The Court used strong language when it recognized that
“[t]he severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of banishment or
exile’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her
noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”191 Further,
the Court even went so far as to declare that “[i]t is [the Court’s]
responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal
188. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013).
189. Id. at 1109.
190. Bibas, supra, note 176, at 1128.
191. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-91
(1947)).
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defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the “mercies of
incompetent counsel.”192 This judicial responsibility has two components in the deportation warning context: (1) ensuring that
future noncitizen litigants do not fall victim to incompetent counsel, and (2) providing an avenue to obtain redress for those noncitizen litigants who do fall victim to incompetent counsel. While
Padilla was a momentous step in the right direction as to the first
component, for the Court to fully meet its formidable responsibility, it must do more to ensure that noncitizens like Mr. Hernandez, Mr. Flores, and Mr. Padilla are all able to obtain relief,
regardless of the state or federal district. Until Strickland’s prongtwo prejudice inquiry is dealt with in the Padilla context, the
Court is not fully meeting its “responsibilit[ies] under the
Constitution.”193

B.

Proposed Solutions to Achieve Padilla’s Goals in
the Post-Conviction Context

1. Determining the Body of Law at Which Padilla is
Aimed
In untangling how Padilla can be utilized in the post-conviction context, and in order to construct a more effective solution
than the current Padilla doctrine provides, it is important to
determine what issue the Court’s holding is aimed at remedying.
By recognizing that Padilla’s undercurrents include IAC issues,
immigration issues, collateral consequence issues, issues owing to
our “system of pleas,” and perhaps even voluntariness issues,
more precise tools can be used instead of “swinging a sledge” to try
to deal with them together.194 Padilla was a unique case in the
sense that it was addressing the important immigration issue of
deporting noncitizens who enter plea agreements for minor
offenses, but did so based on Sixth Amendment IAC doctrine. This
is part of the reason that Justice Alito concurred rather than joining the majority, and part of the reason that Justice Scalia dissented. Prior to Padilla, there was a substantial body of law owing
to the direct/collateral consequence distinction, and the concurring and dissenting Justices were concerned that the result of
Padilla would be to completely eviscerate “the longstanding and
unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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scope of criminal defense counsel’s duty to advise on collateral
consequences.”195 While the Court could have declared that deportation is a direct consequence in order to corral the effect of
Padilla on the collateral/direct consequence distinction in IAC
doctrine, it did not do so, giving rise to the non-joining Justices’
concerns.
Aside from the direct/collateral consequence distinction, if
Padilla is properly viewed as just another case in continuing line
of IAC doctrine, the prejudice issue will likely need to be explored
in greater depth for the decision to have any teeth. If one views
the Padilla “decision as applying ‘a well-established rule of law in
a new way based on the specific facts of a particular case,’ ” the
lack of a coherent framework for a prong-two prejudice analysis in
the Padilla context will render the decision of little value to
aggrieved noncitizens trying to use the Supreme Court’s holding
in post-conviction proceedings.196 A case that provides virtually no
remedy to individuals who have had their Sixth Amendment
rights violated surely cannot be the culmination of, or even a triumph within, the Gideon v. Wainwright line of cases unless the
prejudice issue is addressed in subsequent cases. The reason for
this lack of value to post-conviction litigants is the nature of our
criminal justice system, in which “longer sentences exist on the
books largely for bargaining purposes.”197 While laws with this
aim are generally justified on judicial economy grounds, they have
also have an unintended impact in that they make meeting the
rationality standard of the prejudice analysis difficult, if not
impossible. In a criminal justice system where “individuals who
accept a plea bargain[s] receiv[e] shorter sentences than other
individuals who are less morally culpable but take a chance and
go to trial,”198 requiring noncitizen defendants to show that it
would have been objectively rational to reject a plea and go to trial
is an increasingly difficult proposition. Finally, Padilla contains
language that implies that it is, at least in part, a judicial
response to the evolution of the immigration system in the U.S.,
and more specifically to the fact that “[t]he ‘drastic measure’ of
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”199 While this evolution—an
195. Id. at 1492 (Alito, J., concurring).
196. Gray Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles For Review in
State And Federal Courts, 23 FED. SENT. R. 239, 240 (2011).
197. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
198. Id.
199. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
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evolution that Stevens meticulously outlined—is a creature of
statute, the Padilla decision does not deal with the underlying legislation. Rather, Stevens noted that because of this statutory
evolution, the “importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens
accused of crimes has never been more important.”200 Because
Congress has such broad powers in the context of immigration,201
legislation in this area will generally be upheld, provided that
Congress utilizes “constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.”202 In Padilla, however, this legislative evolution spilled over into the IAC context, allowing Stevens to address
an immigration issue without any actual immigration legislation
being challenged. By outlining this evolution, then explaining that
“deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes,”203 it is clear that
Stevens was mindful that Padilla was, in addition to an IAC case,
also a case about the state of the U.S. immigration and criminal
justice systems.
Because Padilla was a multi-doctrinally reaching case, and
was resolved exclusively through the Sixth Amendment IAC jurisprudence, additional work in this body of law remains to be done.
In order for the Court to meet its responsibility to noncitizens that
do not receive constitutionally competent counsel in the plea bargain context, further development of what Padilla started must be
completed in order to address the other concerns implicated in the
case. While Padilla was based on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence alone, this article will advocate for the use of a Mirandatype204 overly broad, prophylactic approach. This proposal would,
in this author’s opinion, provide a better remedy in the post-conviction context than Padilla for individuals that do not receive
their Padilla-mandated level of counsel.

2. Scalia’s Approach: Stating the Obvious to Avoid Taking
Action
Justice Scalia, though doing so in dissent, clearly and succinctly identified the most effective method for achieving meaningful change—in the post-conviction context—in the body of law
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 364.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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that Padilla addressed. Scalia can be a polarizing figure, and in
many instances has drawn the scorn of legal scholars for what
CNN described as Scalia’s “bold disagreement, conservative arguments, pointed questions and the occasional crude hand gesture.”205 Scalia’s textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation and his “adherence to the original meaning of the
Constitution sometimes results in holdings that negatively impact
the accused,”206 leading one commentator to refer to him as an
“increasingly intolerant and intolerable blowhard: a pompous celebrant of his own virtue and rectitude.”207 While Scalia’s dissent in
Padilla certainly aligns with his conservative values,208 his
approach and rationale seem to be based, at least in part, on simple practicality as opposed to his conservative ideology. Scalia’s
dissent centered on his opinion that “[s]tatutory provisions [could
have remedied] these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and
without producing permanent, and legislatively irreparable,
overkill.”209 While it is debatable210 whether or not the Padilla
decision produced “permanent, and legislatively irreparable,
overkill,”211 Justice Scalia’s opinion that Congress could have remedied the concerns in a more targeted fashion could not have been
more accurate. In fact, by merely reinstating JRAD or pre-IIRIRA
discretion in the Attorney General, Congress could have all but
abrogated the need for Padilla. This is not to minimize the value
of requiring that counsel advise clients about the deportation consequences of entering into a plea; rather, it just suggests that if
Mr. Padilla, Ms. Chaidez, Mr. Flores, or Mr. Hernandez could
have sought relief through either JRAD or from the attorney gen205. Jamie Gumbrecht, Even in dissent, Scalia stirs controversy, CNN (July 18,
2012) http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/18/justice/antonin-scalia-profile/index.html (last
viewed Jan. 16, 2013).
206. Davoli, supra, note 122, at 693.
207. Gumbrecht, supra, note 210 (quoting Paul Campos, Antonin Scalia, ranting
old man, SALON (June 25, 2012) http://www.salon.com/2012/06/25/antonin_scalia_
ranting_old_man/).
208. See generally id.
209. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 389 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Bibas, supra, note 176, at 1128 (Arguing that “increased transparency and
disclosure may have a different effect on legislatures. If full disclosure of overly harsh
collateral consequences causes many defendants to balk at pleading guilty,
prosecutors may press for reforms. They may urge legislatures either to curtail
collateral consequences, or at least to make them waivable as part of plea bargains, to
avoid gumming up the plea-bargaining assembly line. Alternatively, they may press
legislatures to give them even bigger sticks with which to threaten higher post-trial
penalties and so coerce pleas.”).
211. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 389 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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eral, they would not have been before the respective Courts in the
first place.
Though only Justice Scalia’s opinion addressed it directly, it
would seem as though the majority recognized that the problem it
was addressing in Padilla was one that legislation may have been
better suited to address, or at the very least recognized that the
problem had been caused by Congressional action.212 Recognition
that the problems addressed in Padilla grew out of Congress’s
dramatic overhaul of our immigration system is evidenced by Justice Stevens tracing the legislative evolution of the immigration in
the U.S. over the last century, ultimately leading to an immigration regime where “discretionary relief is not available for an
offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance.”213 For Justice Stevens, the modern immigration system began to take shape
with the passage of the 1917 Act, which he thought brought radical changes.214 Of particular interest to Stevens, however, was a
specific safety measure included in the Act, which his majority
opinion described in great detail:
While the 1917 Act was “radical” because it authorized
deportation as a consequence of certain convictions, the Act
also included a critically important procedural protection to
minimize the risk of unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge
in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to
make a recommendation “that such alien shall not be
deported.” . . . This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against deportation, or JRAD, had the effect of
binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute
was “consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing
judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular
conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation,” Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2
1986). Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature
as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of
deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to
ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case basis.215

This JRAD protection was, however, eliminated by Congress in
212. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., recognizing that, because of
congressional action, the “landscape of federal immigration law has changed
dramatically over the last 90 years.”).
213. Id. at 364.
214. Id. at 361.
215. Id.
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1990.216 Further stripping noncitizen defendants of protections
from deportation, Congress eliminated the Attorney General’s
ability to grant discretionary relief when it passed the IIRIRA.217
The majority was concerned that in this new post-IIRIRA era
if a noncitizen commits a removable offense, his removal is practically inevitable.218 It was because of these changes that Mr.
Padilla was unable to receive any relief, discretionary or otherwise, despite having been a lawful permanent resident of the
United States for more than 40 years and serving in the U. S.
Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.219 The majority seemed to
imply that but for these Congressional changes, there would have
been no need to expand its effective assistance of counsel doctrine
to cover deportation warnings.220 This is where Scalia’s point of
contention with the Stevens’ majority opinion lies; Scalia criticized the majority’s use of the Sixth Amendment as an “all-purpose tool for judicial construction,” rather than to guarantee “the
accused a lawyer ‘for his defense’ against a “criminal
prosecution[n].”221
Scalia discussed several measures that Congress could undertake to address the underlying issues that gave rise to the need for
Padilla, such as “specify[ing] which categories of misadvice about
matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements,
what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant’s
attention, and what warnings must be given.”222 Scalia’s other suggestion for how Congress may address the matter through legislation seems to more accurately reflect that the Padilla case is not
as much about IAC as it is about counteracting the legislative
overhaul of the immigration system in the U.S. Scalia proffered
that Congress could further shape immigration law by passing
legislation mandating “that the near-automatic removal which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the
conviction rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel’s misad216. Id. at 363.
217. Id.
218. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363.
219. Id. at 359.
220. See id. at 364 (“These changes to our immigration law have dramatically
raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. The importance of accurate
legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. These
changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”).
221. Id. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 392.
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vice regarding removal consequences.”223 This conception, while
failing to address unadvised noncitizens or mandate a certain constitutional level of advisement, would at least provide some sort of
remedy in the post-conviction context to misadvised noncitizen
defendants. The advantage to such an approach is that ambiguity
would no longer exist as to the impact of Padilla on the collateral/
direct consequence distinction. The merits of the direct/collateral
distinction in IAC doctrine will be left for other scholars to debate;
however, it was clear in Padilla that none of the factions of Justices were ready to completely upend of the use of the distinction
when determining the scope of an attorney’s duties under the
Sixth Amendment. For legislation like the kind discussed by
Scalia to be an adequate substitute or supplement to Padilla, however, it would have to cut broad enough to include both unadvised
and misadvised noncitizen defendants. If passed, such legislation
would provide a better avenue to relief than aggrieved individuals
have now under a Strickland/Hill/Padilla based claim. Further,
it would protect the integrity of the underlying conviction by shifting the focus from the conviction in general to just to the immigration consequences. Given the Court’s “fundamental interest in the
finality of guilty pleas,” a law that protects noncitizen defendants
without undermining the finality of guilty pleas would seem
preferable.224
Though none of the opinions address it, another way Congress
could deal with the problem of near-automatic deportation for
unadvised or misadvised noncitizen defendants, and one that the
majority would presumably support,225 would be for Congress to
simply repeal the IIRIRA, or at least the part that eliminated the
Attorney General’s discretion, along with the 1990 legislation that
eliminated JRAD. Like Scalia’s aforementioned proposal, legislation accomplishing these goals would again focus on the deportation, not the underlying conviction that caused the deportation. A
peculiarity with the current doctrine, at least in the post-conviction context, is that while Padilla-type arguments are used to
invalidate convictions, most litigants really only seek to avoid
removal. In fact, in many of the cases that have dealt with Padilla
issues the defendants have already served their sentences and
223. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citing United States v. Timmreck, 441
U.S. 780 (1979)).
225. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., discussing the impact that the 1990 Act
and the IIRIRA have had on noncitizens convicted of removable offenses.).
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returned to their daily lives, only to be deported years later.226
This is why Justice Scalia’s assertion that the majority was
“swinging a sledge where a tack hammer [was] needed” may have
had at least some merit to it.227 In effect, Padilla represents a
major upheaval in IAC jurisprudence, despite the fact that all
noncitizen defendants really hope to accomplish is to avoid
removal.
Though the Court has a history of stepping in where Congressional action is determined to be unconstitutional, and striking
down legislation, the laws at that led to the need for a case like
Padilla are not conducive to such action, even if the validity of the
subject immigration legislation were ever to come before the
Court. Congress has plenary power, subject only to “important
constitutional limitations,”228 to determine whether certain noncitizens will be allowed to enter or remain in the United States.229
Because the IIRIRA and other Congressional actions do not
appear to raise separation of powers,230 Due Process,231 Equal Protection, or any other apparent Constitutional concerns, the Court
would have to stretch to make another doctrinal body of law fit, or
start down a new path altogether. It seems unlikely that the
Court would be willing to cause such turbulence in an attempt to
remedy the already pervasive turmoil that exists within the body
of law where the criminal justice system and the immigration system converge, or the “crimmigration”232 doctrine as one scholar
226. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S 730, 2012 FLA. LEXIS 2416
(Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (Despite the fact that Mr. Hernandez was denied relief because
his claim predated Padilla, the Court explained that not only had Mr. Hernandez
served out his punishment, but he had also “gone on to attain a number of
achievements—a Bachelor of Arts Degree in 2005, and gainful employment as a
computer network administrator for a Miami bank group.”).
227. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
229. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
230. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, States that “Congress shall have power to . . . provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United States . . . [and] establish a
uniform rule of naturalization.” Reading these clauses in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause found in the final clause of ART. I, § 8, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to attack the legislation on a lack of power, or separation of
powers theory.
231. While the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments can
be used in the plea-bargain context on a voluntariness theory, trying to use them to
invalidate the immigration legislation entirely does not work due to the fact that
there is a comprehensive immigration scheme, made up of both Article III and nonArticle III courts, in place to ensure Due Process. The voluntariness theory applies
only to a waiver of the rights provided by the scheme, but is not applicable in a
context other than plea-bargaining.
232. Markowitz, supra note 27, at 1316.
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termed this area of overlap. Thus, if a repeal of the IIRIRA, 1990
Act, or any of the other pieces of legislation that make up the body
of the U.S. immigration system are going to take place, such a
repeal will have to come from the legislature, not the judiciary.
Scalia is correct in the sense that Congressional action would
seem to afford the most targeted, effective route to achieve change
in the post-conviction context of Padilla; however, this is just stating the obvious, and it completely fails to acknowledge the drawbacks of waiting for Congress to act. First, such action depends on
the will of the people, and as we have seen with other social issues
such as segregation, same-sex marriage, and women’s suffrage to
name a few, the will of the majority does not always effectively
protect the minority. Adding to such concerns is the fact that political in-fighting and partisan politics have reached new heights in
recent years—especially in the immigration arena—so relying on
Congress to act in any sort of expeditious manner is likely to prove
a defeating proposition. Given its holding in Padilla, the court was
apparently concerned about the ability or willingness of Congress
to protect the minority, and felt that acting as it did may in fact,
have been necessary to protect the rights of noncitizen defendants.
If this was the Court’s concern, perhaps the Court did not err by
using a sledge where a tack hammer would have sufficed; rather,
it is possible that the Court only used a sledge where a wrecking
ball was needed to ensure that noncitizen defendants get the constitutionally mandated level or advisement, while providing a
remedy in the event that they do not.

3. Miranda v. Arizona: A Model for the Wrecking Ball?
In continuing down the path that the Court began in Padilla
v. Kentucky, and in order to reinforce the protections that the IAC
doctrine provides for individuals raising Padilla based challenges
for post-conviction relief, this article proposes an overly-broad prophylactic holding, similar in structure to the Court’s holding in
Miranda v. Arizona. The aim of such a holding would be to ensure
that the advisement of noncitizen defendants as to the deportation
consequences of taking a plea bargain continues, while providing
a remedy where counsel fails to advise their client of these deportation consequences, and at the same time, causing as little turmoil in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as possible.233 In
delivering its Miranda decision, the Court sought to “give concrete
233. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts
to follow.”234 There is a very real need for concrete constitutional
guidelines for courts and lawyers to follow in the wake of the
1990s immigration reforms and the post-Padilla decisions, and it
will take a decision as complex and far reaching as the one in
Miranda to protect both noncitizen defendants before entering
pleas, and noncitizen defendants that enter pleas due to constitutionally deficient counsel. Just as the Miranda decision did “not
preclude legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed
Miranda warnings but which were at least as effective,”235 the
Court should craft a decision that would allow for Congress to
pass measures that would be at least as effective as those that the
Court enunciates in its holding.
Miranda provides a template for how a prophylactic Padilla
opinion could be structured. Just as the Miranda decision was
founded, in part, upon Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court would be wise to base any subsequent,
prophylactic Padilla ruling on these two Amendments as well.236
Despite the fact that he tried to qualify his mentioning of the Due
Process Clauses by adding a footnote saying an argument founded
in Due Process jurisprudence would likely fail, Justice Scalia was
absolutely right in acknowledging that there was concern about
the “voluntariness of Padilla’s guilty plea” and such “concern
properly relates to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”237 Justice Scalia even went so far as to conclude his qualifying footnote by stating, “[w]hatever the outcome,
however, the effect of misadvice regarding such consequences
upon the validity of a guilty plea should be analyzed under the
Due Process Clause.”238
While Miranda and Padilla prophylactic-type opinions may
be able to rely on the same Amendments, the difference is what
clause of the Fifth Amendment is pertinent to the respective in
cases. In Miranda, the Fifth Amendment clause of interest was
“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself”; in the proposal this article suggests the relevant
234. Id. at 441-42.
235. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000).
236. Id. at 433 (“Over time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases for the
requirement that a confession be voluntary to be ad- mitted into evidence: the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
237. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1496 n. 1.
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clause is “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”239 In Miranda, the Court refused to:
presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of
his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination
has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not
show that any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and
intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent
record.240
This article advances the idea that the Court should refuse to presume voluntariness in a noncitizen defendant’s plea, absent certain steps being taken to ensure that the plea was “a knowing and
intelligent waiver”241 of the constitutional protections provided to
noncitizen defendants. The Court could create a rebuttable presumption that, if a noncitizen defendant has been deported or
faces deportation, he has been prejudiced. Under the Voluntariness Doctrine, “[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be
voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”242 The Voluntariness and IAC doctrines have
overlapping elements, shown by the Court’s pronouncement in
Hill that “[w]here, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel
during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of
counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.”243 Thus, Padilla is certainly a case
where concerns over the voluntariness of the plea are implicated.
In order for a valid waiver of rights under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process jurisprudence, “[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”244 Further, under
Boykin v. Alabama, “the record must affirmatively disclose that a
defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly
and voluntarily.”245 In a 2004 case, with Justice Souter writing for
the majority, the Court further expanded upon its holding in
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966).
Id.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
Id. at 756 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
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Boykin by noting, “when the record of a criminal conviction
obtained by guilty plea contains no evidence that a defendant
knew of the rights he was putatively waiving, the conviction must
be reversed.”246 Further, Justice Souter noted, “[w]e do not suggest
that such a conviction could be saved even by overwhelming evidence that the defendant would have pleaded guilty regardless.”247
The rationale that the Court has often cited for this treatment
towards pleas where a lack of knowledge is shown is that “the plea
is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant’s
consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a
trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.248
By utilizing the line of cases owing to Boykin v. Alabama to
address the Court’s responsibility to provide an avenue to obtain
redress for those noncitizen litigants who fall victim to incompetent counsel, an aggrieved Defendant would not have the Courtroom doors slammed shut by an inability to show that “a decision
to reject the plea bargain would have been [objectively] rational
under the circumstances.”249 While a voluntariness claim under
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
would still require a showing of prejudice, this could be done so by
demonstrating it was “reasonably probable he would have gone to
trial absent the error.”250 Unlike Padilla’s objective inquiry, however, “it is no matter that the choice may have been foolish.”251
In outlining a broad, prophylactic warning for Padilla claims,
the Court would have to decide what steps must be taken, and by
whom, to ensure that the noncitizen defendant’s plea and waiver
were knowing and voluntary. In Miranda, the Court held that to
show the “defendant [had] been effectively apprised of his rights
and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded,”252 four warnings must be given when a custodial interrogation takes place: “that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
246. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 84 n.10 (2004) (citing
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
247. Id.
248. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
249. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 480, 486 (2000)).
250. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 84, n.10 (2004) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
251. Id. at 84.
252. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966).

\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL103.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 43

THE PADILLA WRECKING BALL

12-FEB-14

11:31

263

to any questioning if he so desires.”253 Just as the Miranda court
determined that these four warnings, or “preventive medicine” as
Justice Scalia mockingly referred to them,254 would provide a remedy to aggrieved litigants deprived of their Sixth Amendment
rights, the court in crafting an opinion to combat the immigration
issues discussed, must determine what “preventive medicine”
would remedy that which ails the post-IIRIRA immigration
system.
Because the proposed doctrinal structure of prophylactic
Padilla warnings would be founded in Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, in addition to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court would not be limited to imposing duties only
on defense counsel. Parties that may be equally as appropriate as
counsel to bear the burden of warning noncitizen defendants of
potential deportation implications include the court, prosecuting
attorneys, the Executive Office of Immigration Reform, the United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or any other of a
plethora of court departments or agencies involved in the deportation process.
While the use of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause would allow for other parties to bear some of the burden, the Court should continue to follow its current Padilla
doctrine that requires the accused’s counsel to inform noncitizen
defendants of the deportation consequences of their accepting a
plea. Because the warnings have a prospective impact on the level
of representation that noncitizens are entitled to in the plea bargain context, Padilla itself meets one of the Court’s two responsibilities: it ensures that future noncitizen defendants do not fall
victim to incompetent counsel. What Padilla, by and large, fails to
do is provide an avenue to obtain redress for those noncitizen litigants who do fall victim to incompetent counsel, despite the
Court’s requirements under Padilla. By requiring a showing of a
certain level of advisement in order to satisfy what I will refer to
as the “Padilla Warnings,” the Court could better address its second responsibility by founding a post-conviction focused, prophylactic ruling in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Voluntariness
Doctrine under the Due Process Clause, as opposed to Sixth
Amendment IAC.
A prophylactic ruling that required the following measures
would be better suited than Padilla to remedy the post-conviction
253. Id. at 479.
254. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 453 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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issues that the Court was unable to address in Padilla: First, ICE,
or another appropriate agency, makes a binding determination of
the removal implications of a noncitizen defendant’s negotiated
plea. Second, such implications must be included in the agreement
accepted by the court. Third, the judge accepting the plea must
warn the noncitizen defendant of these implications. Finally, the
Court must inquire to ensure that the noncitizen defendant’s
attorney had explained the deportation implications of accepting a
plea, and they were the same as those included on the plea agreement. Absent each and every one of these steps being taken to
ensure that the plea was “a knowing and intelligent waiver”255 of
the constitutional protections provided to noncitizen defendants,
the Court could hold a presumption that the plea was not a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act done with “sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”256 As to
the prejudice prong, the Court could then create a rebuttable presumption that if a noncitizen defendant has been deported or faces
deportation, he has been prejudiced.
Such a procedure would seem to afford an effective path to
post-conviction relief where counsel does not meet its constitutional burden of counseling noncitizen defendants as to the deportation implications of accepting a plea. Additionally, putting the
burden on the parties that are upholding and administering the
law conforms with the maxim that “[i]n a free, dynamic society,
creativity . . . is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.”257 The United
State Supreme Court held in INS v. St. Cyr that “[e]lementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
. . . [and] settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”258
Establishing a four step Padilla Warning like the one outlined,
would ensure that noncitizen defendants, attorneys, and judges
255. Id.
256. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
257. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-266 (1994)). Though St. Cyr dealt with the retroactive
application of a procedural change promulgated under the AEDPA and the actual
“criminal actions,” the concern over a defendant’s knowledge and voluntariness in the
plea bargain context indicates that the same concern is applicable to “pleading
actions.” In fact, a lack of knowledge and voluntariness of the direct “legal
consequences of their actions” is the primary tool used to gain relief in the plea
bargain context. 533 U.S. at 316.
258. Id.
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would all “know what the law is”259 and could be confident about
“the legal consequences of their actions.”260 Further, this approach
would not jeopardize the Court’s “fundamental interest in the
finality of guilty pleas,”261 in the IAC context, while still ensuring
that the “grave and solemn act” of entering a plea and admitting
“in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment” is based on the defendant’s “voluntary expression of his own
choice.”262
If the Court were to craft a holding such as the one outlined
above, it would surely come along with a furious dissent from Justice Scalia, provided that he is still on the bench. After all, it was
Justice Scalia who referred to the Court’s use of prophylactic measures in Miranda as “an immense and frightening antidemocratic
power,” and one that “does not exist.”263 While Scalia has
expressed a fervent disapproval of the Court placing “ ‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States,”264 a holding like
the model discussed would be different from the Miranda/Dickerson line of cases in the sense that it would not be a case of the
Court striking down a congressional act based on conflict with a
mere prophylactic holding; rather, it would simply give state and
federal courts a tool to use when interpreting cases similar to
Padilla. While Dickerson would make it difficult for Congress to
directly overturn or contradict such a ruling, it would still allow
state and federal legislatures and courts a tremendous deal of latitude in the event that they choose not to implement the Padilla
Warning protocols laid out. By merely enunciating a rule whereby
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice exists, the individual political bodies would still have full discretion in deciding how to, and
whether to, structure procedures that satisfy the outlined Padilla
Warnings. A Supreme Court Holding like the one outlined would
still allow for “legislation that could solve the problems addressed
by today’s opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion.”265 In
fact, if JRAD and/or the attorney general’s discretion were reinstated, it would all but nullify the need for the procedure because
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citing United States v. Timmreck, 441
U.S. 780 (1979)).
262. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
263. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
264. Id.
265. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 392 (2010).
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most noncitizen defendants could rely on the legislatively proscribed methods by which to stave off deportation.
Additionally, if the Court ever retreated from its Padilla precedent altogether—perhaps because of an ideological shift on the
bench regarding the collateral consequence implications of
Padilla—the prophylactic measures discussed would stand on
their own, even without Padilla. The only role that Padilla serves
in the model discussed is that it imparts a constitutional duty on
attorneys to advise their clients about the deportation implications of taking a plea bargain. Thus, while a retreat from Padilla
would have a negative impact on professional norms in the criminal justice context, individuals like Mr. Padilla, Mr. Hernandez,
Mr. Flores, and Ms. Chaidez would have some sort of recourse in
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment prophylactic measures
would still ensure that their pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. This is, arguably, more protection than
noncitizen defendants in the post-conviction context currently
have based on Padilla.
While most commentators would agree that Miranda’s effectiveness has been limited (at best), perhaps its prophylactic
framework can be dusted off and used as a template for addressing a vitally important issue. Given the complexities and nuances
of trying to navigate IAC doctrine, our modern system of mass
adjudication, and immigration, all in one fell swoop, it may take a
model such as the one discussed above to address an issue that
contains a convergence of so many different bodies of law, without
radically altering the individual doctrines in the process. But the
difficulties and complexities involved should not discourage the
Court from fulfilling its responsibility of providing an avenue to
obtain redress for those noncitizen litigants who do fall victim to
incompetent counsel.

VI. CONCLUSION
Though every rose does in fact have its thorn, the same philosopher went on to say, “every night has its dawn.”266 Noncitizen
defendants who seek relief based on Padilla have their prospects
of relief shrouded in darkness given the difficulties that most will
encounter when trying to show prejudice, but clarity is an achievable goal. Whether by simple Congressional action267 or judicial
266. Michaels, supra note 1.
267. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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wrecking ball,268 this paper puts forth several tangible, effective
alternatives or remedies to deal with the post-conviction thorns
that have been revealed upon closer inspection of the Padilla rose.
Only time will tell whether the Padilla decision itself will be
viewed as a building block in the ever-expanding “crimmigration”
doctrine, an anomaly within the IAC doctrine, or just another consequence of the mass plea-based system of adjudication in which
we live. There is one thing we can be sure of, however: this won’t
be the last that we hear about the several issues that converged
leading up to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky.

268. See infra Section IV.B.3.
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